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A CONVERSATION ABOUT PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: 
TAKE 2 
JANE M. SPINAK*  
 
The University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, 
Gender and Class symposium on problem-solving courts surfaced a 
wide array of issues on the meaning and practices of these courts. My 
prepared remarks at the symposium addressed the first issue discussed 
in this article: the potential disparate impact of problem-solving 
courts on minority families who are disproportionately affected by 
these court processes. The second part of the article draws on the 
discussion during the symposium to reflect on the difficulty supporters 
and critics of the problem-solving court movement have in talking and 
listening to each other. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nationwide problem-solving court reform movement 
arrived in New York during the nineties, encompassing both criminal 
and family courts.1 New York State created its first Family Court 
Treatment Part (FCTP) in 1997,2 which was designated as a “model 
 
Copyright © 2010 by Jane M. Spinak. 
* Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would 
like to thank Michele Cortese, Esq., Deputy Director of the Center for Family Representation, 
for answering my endless questions and always providing insights into the workings of Family 
Court and to congratulate her on being awarded the 2010 New York City Kathryn A. 
McDonald Award for Excellence in Service to Family Court. 
 1. The Center for Court Innovation has been the locus for developing problem-solving 
courts in New York overall, but family problem-solving court projects had multiple sponsors. 
Center for Court Innovation, About, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pageID=471 (last 
visited on Feb. 22, 2010); See also Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential 
of Model Family Courts, 2002 WISC. L. REV., 331, 362 (2002) [hereinafter Adding Value to 
Families]. 
 2. Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 350. In the original FCTP, “parents 
accused of neglecting their children because of their substance abuse participate[d] in an 
extensive court conferencing and monitoring system. Parents eligible for the FCTP [were] 
assessed by the FCTP clinical staff, [were] required to waive their right to a litigated hearing, 
and must admit that the neglect was caused by their addiction. The parent then entere[d] into a 
negotiated treatment plan that [had] been created by the FCTP clinical staff, the parent and her 
counsel, the lawyer for the children, and the child protective agency's attorney and 
caseworker; the plan [had] also been approved by the presiding judge. The parent [was] then 
referred immediately to treatment providers who [had] contracted with the court to have 
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court” site under the auspices of the National Council of Juvenile and 
Family Court Judges Model Courts Project (the Project) in 1998.3 The 
FCTP and the model court paradigm share several common features: 
(1) an activist judge who helps to fashion, and then closely monitor, 
dispositions; (2) a team of lawyers, social workers, and court personnel 
who try to identify and then work toward common goals with the 
family; and (3) frequent and meaningful court appearances by relevant 
parties.4 
When I first heard about problem-solving courts, I was excited 
about the potential for these courts to have a positive effect on the way 
in which Family Court treated the litigants passing through its doors 
and on the outcomes for families mired in the child welfare and foster 
care systems. The judges, lawyers, and court personnel most interested 
in improving the court were leading the efforts and I wanted to join 
them.5 In reality, this was the only game in town, if court reform was 
 
available treatment spaces. What ensue[d] [was] an intensive period of court supervision, with 
frequent in-court drug testing and appearances by the parent and other FCTP “team” members, 
including the lawyers and agency caseworkers. Sanctions for positive drug tests or other lapses 
in compliance with the treatment plan [] range[d] from more frequent drug testing and court 
attendance to ultimate dismissal from the FCTP, which returne[d] the case to the general case 
pool. Rewards [would] include longer periods of visitation and less supervision of the parent 
with her children.” Id. at 332–33. 
 3. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Activities by State, New 
York, 
http://www.ncjfcj.org/images/stories/dept/states/Aug09/new%20york%20state%20outreach.pd
f (last visited on Apr. 13, 2010). The project’s official name was the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ) Permanency Planning for Children’s 
Department’s Child Victims Act Model Courts Project, which was funded by the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention. Adding Value to 
Families, supra note 1, at 361–62. “The model courts initiative is described by its funder, 
OJJDP, as “a nationwide effort to improve how courts handle child abuse and neglect cases, 
[that] is helping children spend less time in foster care and resulting in earlier resolution of 
cases in dependency courts.” The model courts are part of the larger effort by the 
NCJFCJ/PPCD “to educate judges and other practitioners on the need to expedite secure safe 
permanent placements for all maltreated children, either by making it possible for them to 
safely stay with or return to their own families or by finding them safe adoptive homes.” Id. 
The model court description also includes other key elements seen as essential for success: 
interdisciplinary training and technical assistance for all youth-serving professionals using the 
NCJFCJ's Resource Guidelines as a blueprint for improving court practice; identifying "lead" 
judges to mobilize all the relevant players within their jurisdictions; developing programs that 
can be seen as easily replicable in other jurisdictions; piloting innovative alternative dispute 
resolution methods; and sharing information locally and nationwide through enhanced data 
systems.”Id. The current version of the Project’s work is found at National Council of Juvenile 
and Family Court Judges, http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/view/81/145/ (last visited on Feb. 22, 
2010). 
 4. Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 332. 
 5. I have served as a member of the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission 
on Justice for Children (PJCJC) since 1995. “[T]he New York State Court of Appeals 
designated [PJCJC] to implement the New York State Court Improvement Project (CIP), a 
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the game.6 The movement was sweeping the entire country, building 
on what appeared to be remarkable initial success in the adult drug 
court arena.7 In 1996, the number of children in foster care peaked at 
52,369 in New York State, which created a compelling urgency to try 
new ways for the Family Court to address the significant family 
disruptions that led to foster care.8 The problem-solving court 
movement seemed like the answer. 
Even at that early stage of the reform movement, however, I 
began to wonder whether these courts would  preserve the substantive 
due process right of “family integrity” that protects the rights of 
parents to raise their children as they choose and allows children to 
grow up with their own unique family.9 In my first article on this 
subject, I posed two questions. Could model problem-solving courts 
dismiss cases which did not satisfy the requirements of jurisdictional 
 
federally funded project to assess and improve foster care, termination of parental rights and 
adoption proceedings.” New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on the Justice for 
Children, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/justiceforchildren/index.shtml (last visited on Feb. 
22, 2010). Two of the CIP pilot projects in Erie and New York counties were designated 
NCJFCJ Model Courts by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. NEW 
YORK STATE PERMANENT JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 15 YEAR REPORT 19 (2006), 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/justiceforchildren/PDF/Final%20Booklet%20to%20Print.pdf. 
 6. NEW YORK STATE PERMANENT JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, 
supra note 6, at 7. See also, Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 350. 
 7. See Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation 
to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2003). 
 8. CONNA CRAIG & DEREK HERBERT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, THE 
STATE OF THE CHILDREN: AN EXAMINATION OF GOVERNMENT-RUN FOSTER CARE 12 (1997), 
http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st210.pdf. In September 1998, 560,000 children were in foster care 
nationwide. National Foster Care Statistics, http://library.adoption.com/articles/foster-care-
national-statistics.html (last visited on Feb. 22, 2010).  
 9. In its most recent reaffirmation of family integrity, the Supreme Court concluded: 
“In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 
66 (2000). In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that, while the Court has yet to determine a 
child’s liberty interest in his or her family bonds (including those beyond a parent), “it seems 
. . . extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests 
in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, 
must their interests be balanced in the equation.” Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such an 
interest was found recently by a federal district court in Kenny A. v. Perdue, where the court 
stated: 
[C]hildren have fundamental liberty interests at stake in deprivation and 
TPR proceedings. These include a child’s interest in his or her own safety, 
health, and well-being, as well as an interest in maintaining the integrity of 
the family unit and in having a relationship with his or her biological 
parents. 
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005).  
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authority—either because the state could not prove the allegations of 
neglect or abuse or because the state had not satisfied its own 
requirements to provide services and assistance prior to filing a case in 
court?10 Alternatively, would model problem-solving courts, believing 
they could assist the families anyway, ignore those constitutional and 
statutory restrictions?11  
In tracking the publicly-stated goals and activities of model 
courts around the country, I found that the principles for model court 
practice prioritized “avoiding unnecessary separation of children and 
families” and supporting “reunification” of families while keeping 
children safe.12 During the initial five years that followed the 
establishment of the Project, however, the model courts focused on 
goals of efficiency and administrative effectiveness rather than 
substantive outcomes.13 I encouraged the courts to move beyond the 
administrative process goals to use the specialized nature of the model 
court structures—collaborative systemic planning, team conferencing 
and other alternative dispute resolution processes, and significant 
participation by the families themselves—as tools to achieve family 
integrity rather than as ends of their own.14  
While I still believe that a problem-solving court must be 
committed to using these tools to pursue family integrity, child safety 
and permanency, my belief in the ability of these courts to do so has 
significantly diminished. I have addressed this concern elsewhere by 
considering the historical roots of problem-solving courts in the 
trajectory of the Family Court through the Twentieth Century15 and by 
 
 10. Adding Value to Families supra note 1, at 340–42.  
 11. Id. at 340–44, 371–74. An issue I had not considered at the time was whether courts 
could intervene in family life to assist families without explicit jurisdictional authority. For an 
example of such a “court,” see Riverside Superior Court - Family Preservation Court, 
available at  http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/famprescrt/index.html#Procedures (last 
visited on Apr. 25, 2010). 
 12. Id. at 367 (referring to NCJFCJ’s Resource Guidelines). 
 13. Id. at 364. See infra pp. 22–23 for discussion on the continued tension concerning 
the purpose of problem-solving courts.  
 14. Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 370–71. While I made these 
recommendations in the context of model courts, they apply generally to family court which is 
considered the original problem solving court. Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. 
CT. REV. 258, 271 (2008) [hereinafter Romancing the Court]. See also Hon. Leonard P. 
Edwards, Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Santa Clara, Remarks on Receiving the William H. 
Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence at the U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 
18, 2004), available at http://www.improvingoutcomesnetwork.org/viewarticles.jsp (“Juvenile 
Court is the original problem-solving court.”). 
 15. Romancing the Court, supra note 14, at 258. (“[L]essons gleaned from over 100 
years of family court history suggest that court-based solutions to intractable social problems 
have rarely been effective . . . [N]either the structural issues that courts face, such as 
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scrutinizing the limitations of current Family Court reform efforts.16  
For purposes of this article, I want to focus on two somewhat unrelated 
issues about problem-solving courts. My prepared remarks at the 
symposium addressed the first issue to be discussed: the potential 
disparate impact of problem-solving courts on minority families who 
are disproportionately affected by these court processes.17 The second 
part of the article draws on the discussion during the symposium to 
reflect on the difficulty supporters and critics of the problem-solving 
court movement have in talking and listening to each other  
II. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND DISPARATE IMPACT 
Two aspects of problem-solving courts may exacerbate the 
disparate impact of their processes on families of color. The first is 
that by situating the central process of problem-solving for court-
involved families in the court rather than in the community, the 
opportunity for pre-court assistance and services may be lost. The 
incentives for crafting more local, and potentially more effective and 
comprehensive solutions, are diminished if the court process is likely 
to subsume those efforts through its own problem-solving paradigm. 
At the same time, the court loses the insight that may come from 
seeing  how families address the issues that result in court intervention 
 
overwhelming numbers of cases, nor the momentous societal issues that problem-solving 
courts have recently begun to shoulder can be adequately addressed through court-based 
solutions. The factors that allegedly distinguish new problem-solving courts from earlier 
exemplars, especially the family court, are both less unique and less successful than they have 
been portrayed by problem-solving court enthusiasts.”). 
 16. Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting It Right between Rhetoric and 
Reality, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 19–27 (2010). Current family court reform efforts are 
limited in their effectiveness for several reasons. Reformers have relied too heavily on stories 
to identify success, have been unwilling to frame questions about reform differently, have 
relied on conventional reasons for success or failure, and have not subjected reform efforts to 
rigorous analysis [hereinafter Reforming Family Court]. Id. at 38.  
 17. Professor Eric J. Miller has explored this issue considerably. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, 
Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Intervention, 65 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1479, 1568 (2004) [hereinafter Embracing Addiction]; See also Eric J. Miller, Drugs, 
Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 427–31 (2009) [hereinafter 
New Penology]; Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, 20 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 127 (2007) [Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts]. See also Emily 
Wall, Finding a Right to a Speedy Trial in Child Welfare Cases: Recognizing the Value of 
Time 31–34 (Sept. 21, 2009) (summarizing earlier findings of disproportionality of minority 
families in the child welfare system) (unpublished note, on file with author). The NCJFCJ has 
recently launched the Courts Catalyzing Change initiative to respond to the disproportionate 
numbers of children of color in the child welfare and foster care systems and the disparate 
outcomes these children experience. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, 
Courts Catalyzing Change, http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/blogcategory/447/580 (last visited 
on Feb. 22, 2010). 
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within their communities, and the potential to use that insight if or 
when families ultimately require court intervention.18 Additionally, the 
creation of problem-solving courts may result in more families being 
drawn into the court system—often referred to as “net widening”19—
because the lack of community resources leaves the court as the only 
place to secure help.20 Moreover, the back-end services that a problem-
solving court may provide come with additional burdens, including 
increased surveillance of the family and the stigma attached to being 
subject to court processes.21 Finally, court-based solutions focus on the 
 
 18. See CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 
UNDERSTANDING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 19 
(2008) at 19–20 (discussing how focus groups in Texas identified aspects of disproportionality 
in Texas that included a lack of understanding of the social conditions of communities and the 
failure to engage with the community.) [hereinafter CHAPIN HALL REPORT]. 
 19. The term has been frequently used in the criminal and juvenile court context to 
indicate how court-based service or diversion programs may actually bring more people under 
court surveillance and supervision. See, e.g., Mark Ezell, Juvenile Arbitration: Net Widening 
and Other Unintended Consequences, 26 J.RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 358, 375–76 (1989) 
(discussing how a juvenile court diversionary arbitration program resulted in more youth being 
supervised by the court, placed on probation or committed by the judge.) See also, Judge 
Morris B. Hoffman, A Neo-Retributionist Concurs with Professor Nolan, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1567, 1567 (2003) (describing the net-widening effect of the Denver Drug Court). 
 20. See Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering 
Enthusiasm with Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 435, 435–36, 442, 444 (2002); Therapeutic 
Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, supra note 17, at 127. “Establishing community-based 
alternatives to detention (and removal from the home) and utilizing the least restrictive 
supervision options are essential components of reducing racial and ethnic disproportionality 
in both systems. Unfortunately, too often, to be eligible for services, a youth must already 
have penetrated deeply into one or both systems. This is not good for children and families, 
nor is it a cost-effective way to provide supports.” CHAPIN HALL REPORT, supra note 18, at 74. 
See also, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN  IN FOSTER 
CARE: ADDITIONAL HHS ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO HELP STATES REDUCE THE PROPORTION IN 
CARE 31 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07816.pdf  (“Court officials in California 
said that initiatives to refer drug offenders to treatment programs instead of incarceration have 
increased competition for accessing publicly funded substance abuse programs, adding to the 
difficulties families may face in making changes needed for reunification. In addition, when 
services are available, it may take 2 years for a parent to complete a substance abuse treatment 
program, and entry into such programs may be delayed if there are waiting lists for services.”) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 21. See Corey Shdaimah, Taking a Stand in a Not-So-Perfect World: What’s a Critical 
Supporter of Problem-Solving Courts to Do?, 10 U. MD J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 
89 (2010); see also Carren S. Oler, Unacknowledged Shame, Unresolved Family Cases, 38 
MD. B. J.12, 14–16 (“Shame is a family of painful emotions which generally are hidden and 
may include inadequacy, humiliation and embarrassment.”); Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453–56 (2002) (on 
increased court supervision); James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-
Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1562 (2003) (“Therapeutic 
jurisprudence also allows the court to extend its authority into the lives of drug court clients in 
unprecedented ways,”) (using as an example judges who supported a measure to dispense with 
probable cause in order to randomly search drug court participants’ homes). 
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responsibility of the individual: did this parent neglect her child? Is 
this youth a runaway or truant?22 The court is not deciding whether 
society has provided comprehensive supports for families and children 
that might eliminate or ameliorate the need for court intervention at 
all.23 
The second aspect of problem-solving courts that may 
exacerbate the disparate impact of their processes on families of color 
emanates from the first: court-based problem solving is predominantly 
judge-based problem solving. This results in a system in which the 
traditional due process protections afforded by an impartial judge are 
exchanged for judicial leadership that creates its own conception of 
fairness and due process.24 Such a system may be particularly 
vulnerable to creating a disparate impact on families of color.25  
A. Situating Problem-Solving in Courts 
A persistent question nagging the problem-solving court 
movement is whether the problem to be solved is best solved through 
court processes.26 The National Association of Criminal Defense 
 
 22. New Penology, supra note 17, at 427, 432 (discussing how the individual 
responsibility therapeutic model in drug courts doesn’t engage “with the wider perspective of 
governmental and social failure that is the backdrop against which many drug addicts live their 
lives”). 
 23. While family court judges have a statutory duty to determine whether “reasonable 
efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families (i) prior to the placement of a child in 
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child's home; and (ii) to make it 
possible for a child to safely return to the child's home.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006) (as 
amended by the Adoption And Safe Families Act of 1997), a recent report noted that judges 
found that “reasonable efforts” to achieve permanency for children in foster care were made in 
all but six out of 463 permanency cases reviewed in the study, raising “questions regarding the 
threshold used to make these determinations and the relevance of such findings.” CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS, THE LONG ROAD HOME: STRANDED IN NEW YORK CITY FOSTER CARE 192 (2009), 
available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2009/11/2009-11-
02_long_road_home_full_report_final.pdf.  For a discussion of the state of child well being 
generally in the United States, see UNICEF, AN OVERVIEW OF CHILD WELL-BEING IN RICH 
COUNTRIES: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE LIVES AND WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS IN THE ECONOMICALLY ADVANCED NATIONS 2 (2007), http://www.unicef-
irc.org/publications/pdf/rc7_eng.pdf (ranking the United States twenty out of twenty-one 
among the countries surveyed on six measures of child well being).  
 24. See discussion infra at notes 61–63 (discussing an example of the N.Y. treatment 
parts that still haven’t adopted statewide basic protocols on how the courts should work); 
Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, supra note 17, at 127 (pointing out the 
difficulty of measuring success because of the range of models used in problem solving 
courts). 
 25. See discussion infra at pp. 8–10. 
 26. Romancing the Court, supra note 14, at 259–60. This has been a central query 
within the family court since its inception. Id.  
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Lawyers (NACDL) recently released a report on drug courts 
recommending that substance abuse treatment be considered a public 
health rather than a criminal justice issue.27 The report warns that the 
criminal justice paradigm for substance abuse treatment “legitimizes 
drugs (sic) courts while ignoring other smart, fair, effective, and 
economical approaches.”28 Similarly, in recent years, the practice of 
diverting adolescent status offenses from family court jurisdiction and 
dual tracking child protection investigations to community-based 
assistance by distinguishing between cases likely to need court 
intervention and those more suited for voluntary provision of services, 
is based on an understanding that readily available, community crafted 
assistance that avoids court entirely may be more effective in 
addressing family needs.29  
Nevertheless, the proliferation of problem-solving courts in 
multiple dimensions of minority and poor peoples’ lives30—from drug 
courts to truancy courts to homelessness courts to reentry courts—
reinforces a belief that these problems are best addressed by judges in 
 
 27. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, AMERICA’S PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 10 (2009), 
[hereinafter NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS] 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/665b5fa31f96bc4085
2574260057a81f/$FILE/problem-solvingreport_110409_629(K+PMS3145).pdf. See also 
Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC. 
POL'Y & L. 590, 595–600 (2005) (arguing for an empirically-based system of assistance to 
address the multiplicity of factors that produce child maltreatment and subsequent child 
welfare interventions, including foster care). 
 28. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 27, at 10. 
 29. Reforming Family Court, supra note 16, at 35–36 (discussing diversion of status 
offense cases based on programs developed and evaluated by the Vera Institute of Justice); 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO CHILD 
MALTREATMENT: FINDINGS FROM NCANDS 21–22 (2005),  http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/05/child-
maltreat-resp/report.pdf  (“The findings are consistent with the expectation that these families’ 
circumstances may not warrant a traditional [Child Protective Services] response, but can 
benefit from some intervention to prevent potential or future maltreatment . . . It appears that 
services are being provided to a greater proportion of families who receive an alternative 
response. It also appears from this data that even though children who had been previously 
referred to alternative response do experience subsequent reports and responses by CPS, in 
general they are not at any greater risk for subsequent reports than those who received an 
investigation. Furthermore, they are not at any greater risk for subsequent victimization. With 
this knowledge, at the system level, agencies that refer children and families to the alternative 
response or investigation track may be confident that, if specified guidelines guide the 
decision, the child’s future safety is no more likely to be compromised.”). 
 30. The “national phenomenon” of the overrepresentation of minority children and 
families in child welfare and family court systems has been well documented. THE CENTER 
FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, RACE EQUITY REVIEW: FINDINGS FROM A QUALITATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN 
AND FAMILIES IN MICHIGAN’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1 (2009) [hereinafter THE CENTER FOR 
THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY]. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 4. 
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what have been called “therapeutic” court settings rather than by other 
means.31 Writing about criminal reentry courts, Professor Eric Miller 
questions “whether this therapeutic paradigm unfairly places 
accountability for reentry issues on individual offenders while 
minimizing governmental responsibility for a range of institutional 
failures in the areas of health care, education, housing and 
employment.”32 Both the standard Family Court and the current 
problem-solving variations on that standard similarly place 
accountability on the individual rather than on the predominant causes 
of neglect and abuse: poverty and its ensuing hardships.33 Moreover, 
according to Professor Miller, “[t]herapy and responsibility 
disaggregate the problem of drug crime from social and governmental 
forces. They take the emphasis off the increasing racial segregation 
and class stratification of the inner city, and emphasize the personal 
characteristics of the addict.”34 Instead, these underlying causes and 
the broader societal and institutional failures to address them are 
marginalized when the judiciary shifts the burden of resolution onto 
the individual through a judge-driven therapeutic mechanism.35  
Centering the resolution of these issues on the individual parent 
in a problem-solving proceeding assumes that the parent has access to 
and is supported by a system of services and assistance that maximizes 
the parent’s ability to resolve the child protection issues facing her 
 
 31. Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and 
Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1517–25 (2003). See also 
JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 57–59 
(2001).  
 32. Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, supra note 17, at 127. Professor 
Miller expresses considerable concern that “[g]iven that the central problem facing ex-
prisoners reentering society is the failure of the government to adequately provide medical, 
education, health, housing, and other social services before they were incarcerated and upon 
release, it is essential to question the drug and reentry courts’ emphasis on personal 
responsibility. The therapeutic model, in this setting, appears to have the effect of attempting 
to convince the ex-inmate that these social failings are of little consequence: the problem is the 
ex-inmate’s life choices, rather than society’s choices about where and how to distribute its 
resources to different communities.” Id. at 131. 
 33. Garrison, supra note 27, at 612–14 (identifying poverty as the most important risk 
factor in child maltreatment but also discussing the correlation among multiple risk factors). 
 34. New Penology, supra note 17, at 427. Miller also quotes Douglas Massey and Nancy 
Denton, who state that “one third of all African Americans in the United States live under 
conditions of intense racial segregation.”  Id. at 428 (citing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. 
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 77 
(1996)). 
 35. Garrison, supra note 27, at 595–99 (outlining the various ways in which social 
policies and law have failed to understand, prevent or address child maltreatment). The more 
the burden for addressing child welfare is placed on the individual through the therapeutic-
judicial paradigm, the less likely that Garrison’s recommendations will be considered. 
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family. If, for example, African-American families do not have 
consistent access to prevention and early intervention services, their 
communities lack basic services, there is an unequal distribution of 
state resources to African-American communities, and these families 
struggle “to find and maintain suitable and affordable housing, reliable 
transportation, and a legal source of regular income,” the disparate 
impact on the ability of these families to resolve their child welfare 
issues is readily apparent. This was a central conclusion of a recent 
study of decision-making in child welfare cases in Michigan by the 
Center for the Study of Social Policy.36 The study further concluded 
that both child protective services and the court system failed to 
recognize or draw on the strengths of African-American families, to 
consider community-based, non-traditional resources for these 
families, to engage the families in authentic participation in decision-
making, or to respect family recommendations.37 The study further 
found that the failure to engage the families and their communities in a 
discussion about what resources and assistance could assist the 
families were among the factors that led to disproportionate numbers 
of children being removed from their families and communities.38 
 
 36. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 20 (“While both 
Caucasian and African American families were living in poverty, this Review observed the 
particularly pernicious effects of poverty on African American families.”); Embracing 
Addiction, supra note 17, at 1568 (“Statistical evidence suggest that poorer offenders are more 
likely to agree to go to drug court than rich ones . . . The differential impact of the criminal 
justice system on poor individuals may be exacerbated for minorities, who are much more 
likely to receive incarcerative sentences than non-minorities. Such factors may lead poor and 
minority defendants to access diversion into drug court where others would not.”) New 
Penology, supra note 17, at 425 (“ I shall suggest that the drug court’s success in generating 
broad bipartisan appeal stems from its therapeutic approach to drug offenders, one in which 
responsibility replaces race as the major issue facing individual addicts.”). 
 37. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 19; New Penology, 
supra note 17, at 425 (discussing “what David Garland calls a ‘responsibilization strategy’ 
placing the onus on individuals to alter their conduct rather than on emphasizing rights to 
access government social welfare services.”) (citing DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 118, 124 (2001)). 
 38. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 20–22, 37–38, 43–
44. See also Alan J Dettlaff & Joan R Rycraft, Deconstructing Disproportionality: Views 
From Multiple Community Stakeholders, 87 CHILD WELFARE 37, 55 (2008) (“Finally, findings 
from these focus groups clearly indicate the need for child welfare agencies to improve their 
relationship with the community. To reduce disproportionality, child welfare agencies must 
ally themselves with communities and draw upon the strengths of communities to address this 
problem. To facilitate meaningful engagement, efforts must be long-term and consistent. 
Meetings and open forums should be held with community groups, churches, schools, and 
other community stakeholders on a consistent basis. Agency administrators should establish 
connections with community agencies to develop collaborative partnerships that work toward 
the common goal of improving outcomes for children and families. Additional strategies 
include the establishment of satellite offices within communities and the development of 
community-based family service centers that emphasize community support and prevention.”). 
Do Not Delete 6/14/2010  3:46 PM 
2010] A CONVERSATION: TAKE 2 123 
Equally disturbing, the study found “little evidence of monitoring for 
the quality and the cultural relevance of the services provided,” and 
“no evidence of institutional policies and practices to hold these 
practitioners accountable for the quality of their work.”39 Children 
were considered better off removed from their families because child 
protective services and the courts doubted that the children’s 
communities could take care of them.40  
Shifting resources and planning to the court system as the 
problem-solver rather than providing resources and financial support 
to empower communities to create effective strategies and solutions 
will do little to eliminate the problem of disparate treatment.41 In fact, 
shifting to back-end services increases surveillance of parents that can 
result in additional monitoring,42 additional legal proceedings,43 and 
even a shift into the criminal justice system with potentially dire 
consequences, including denying access to many public benefits.44 The 
constant monitoring of parents in many problem-solving court 
paradigms, such as Family Treatment Drug Courts (FTDC), not only 
enables the court to assure a parent’s compliance with court ordered 
treatment and services, but also provides the opportunity to sanction 
her failure to do so.45 Sanctions range from additional court 
appearances to jail.46 The collateral consequences of penetrating the 
 
 39. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 37.  
 40. Id. at 17 (“[T]he Review documented both stated and operational assumption that 
African American children would fare better if removed from their families and 
communities.”). 
 41. Garrison’s analysis of the problems with the way in which maltreatment is addressed 
highlights the need for empirical analyses of the way in which child maltreatment is addressed 
in child welfare systems. Garrison, supra note 27, at 606–11. As difficult as it may be to use 
rigorous empirical analysis in child welfare systems, analysis of court-based intervention is 
even more daunting. Reforming Family Court, supra note 16, at 19–27 (describing the failure 
to measure federally funded court reform efforts). 
 42. Shdaimah, supra note 21, at 98–99; See also Judge Nicolette M. Pach (ret.), An 
Overview of Operational Family Dependency Treatment Courts, 6 DRUG CT. REV., 67, 99–
100. 
 43. Pach, supra note 42, at 99. 
 44. In some FTDCs, failure to comply with treatment or court mandates, sanctions can 
include jail. Id. at 90–91. Some of these courts have concurrent criminal and civil jurisdiction, 
heightening the possibility of significant collateral consequences. Philip Genty, Damage to 
Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1671, 1673 (2003). Even if there is no criminal conviction, the impact on families of 
parents being incarcerated is well documented. See e.g., id. at 1671–72. 
 45. Pach, supra note 42, at 90; see discussion infra pp. 14–15 on FDTC. 
 46. Pach, supra note 42, at 90–91. The California Supreme Court recently held that the 
juvenile dependency court does not have the statutory authority to punish a parent for 
contempt (and order contempt sanctions such as jail time) solely on the basis that the parent 
has failed to comply with court-ordered drug treatment. In re Nolan W., 45 Cal.4th 1217 
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criminal justice system for failure to comply with an FTDC order 
could result in insurmountable barriers to reunification of the family.47 
And the ultimate punishment for failure in FTDC is a parent 
permanently losing custody of her child.48  
The potential disparate impact on minority families of creating 
and situating solutions to child welfare issues in problem-solving 
courts arises out of three interconnected aspects of these courts. The 
first is that placing accountability on the individual to solve the 
problem fails to consider the lack of community and governmental 
resources available within minority communities to address the issues 
these families face. The second is that community-based solutions that 
could draw on the strengths of the community are unlikely to be 
developed if court-based solutions are the norm. This means that help 
is less likely to be provided until the family reaches court and that the 
assistance is less likely to be crafted with a deep understanding of 
community needs or strengths. And lastly, once the family reaches 
court, the traditional due process protections afforded by an impartial 
judge no longer serve as a final defense to improper government 
intervention, as the next section discusses. 
B. Judicial Leadership 
The role of the judge as a leader of a therapeutic team 
reinforces the shift of services from the community to the court, as 
well as the re-characterization of those services from social 
responsibilities to individualized needs. The team leader role also 
 
(2009). While the court declined to address the impact of its ruling on juvenile court drug 
courts, Id. at 1226 n.3, the Administrative Office of the Courts of California recently issued a 
“fact sheet” indicating that incarcerative sanctions were no longer available to use in juvenile 
dependency drug courts as a result of the Nolan W. decision. Changing Behavior: Incentives 
and Sanctions in Juvenile Dependency Drug Court, March 2010, 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/factsheets/jddc.pdf (last visited on Apr. 27, 
2010). 
 47. Most FDTCs do not have criminal jurisdiction or sanctions; for those that do, 
however, the collateral consequences can be devastating. See Reentry Resource Center New 
York, http://www.reentry.net/ny/ (last visited on Feb. 22, 2010); See also Michael Pinard, An 
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry 
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–40 (2006). 
 48. NPC RESEARCH, FAMILY TREATMENT DRUG COURT EVALUATION:  FINAL REPORT 
2 (2007); Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1239–40 (1998). As Professor Richard Boldt has warned 
in the criminal court context, failure to be cured  results in punishment. In the family court 
context, that includes termination of parental rights. 
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fundamentally changes the nature of the judge’s job.49 While the 
therapeutic leader is heralded as innovative in the problem-solving 
court movement, the roots and controversy of this role are deep in the 
history of the original family court.50 In writing about the early 
development of family courts, one writer opined in 1919: 
The judgments of a judicial officer as at present 
constituted in this country are confined to the pleadings 
and to the testimony taken in open court. He does not 
take the initiative in any proceeding brought before 
him. His sole duty is to determine under the law and the 
facts the questions presented. The judge of a family 
court must have larger powers than these. He must be at 
liberty to investigate or cause to be investigated every 
anti-social or abnormal act growing out of family 
disturbances. His duties must necessarily be 
inquisitorial rather than accusatory. . .To empower a 
judge to act on his own initiative immediately and 
without pleadings; to authorize him to become the 
general supervisor and mentor of the home and its 
several occupants, will be a new thing in our 
jurisprudence. It is apparent, therefore, that a judge who 
is given these extraordinary powers must be a man well 
versed in the law, of large experience, unswerving 
firmness, broad sympathies, and clear, quick and 
accurate judgments. Wanting in any of these elements, 
his work must fail.51 
The quote describes the judge as the hero who, lacking any of 
these extraordinary powers or virtues, succumbs to defeat. One way in 
which defeat has been averted (since having all of these “elements” is 
 
 49. NOLAN, supra note 31, at 90–110 (analyzing the differences between our conception 
of a common law judge and the drug court judge. In particular, it highlights a significant 
departure from the impartial, restrained, objective judge in the common law tradition. Nolan’s 
description is equally applicable to other problem solving courts.). See also NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 27, at 27 (“When participants enter 
drug court they would be well-advised to “[p]repare to turn our life over to this judge and her 
whims for at least the next year or two.” One judge candidly admitted that he did things that 
were “absolutely over the line in the canons of judicial conduct” such as midnight curfew 
checks on participants and sitting in on treatment meetings.”). 
 50. Romancing the Court, supra note 14, at 259, 269–71. 
 51. Willis B. Perkins, Family Courts, 17 MICH. L. REV. 378, 380–81 (1918-1919). 
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beyond the capacity of most humans, let alone judges),52 has been the 
imposition of significant due process protections in family court 
proceedings to guard not only the litigants, but also the judge, from his 
own heroism.53 As a result, the prescribed role of the Family Court 
judge during the last quarter of the Twentieth Century included serving 
as a gatekeeper against government overreaching,54 a check against 
bad decision-making on the part of government agents,55 a protector of 
the due process rights of parents and children,56 and an insurer of 
fairness and impartiality.57 If the judge’s primary role is to revert 
instead “to investigate. . .every anti-social or abnormal act growing out 
of family disturbances. . .[and]to authorize him to become the general 
supervisor and mentor of the home,”58 what is the effect on his role of 
impartial decision-maker and protector against government 
 
 52. A description of a family court judge in the mid-Twentieth Century captures the 
concern about infallibility:  
Because each judge must form his own awareness of his lacks, some of 
those who come to this bench remain entirely untutored and, possibly as a 
form of self-defense, scornful of what they do not understand.  One, for 
example, proudly says that he had never been in the court in any capacity 
until the day of this appointment; then he sat on the bench with another 
judge during a morning’s session; and that very afternoon he began 
hearing and deciding cases without further aid or training. During his 
years of service, he adds, he has never had a moment’s worry about the 
soundness of a single one of the thousands of cases he has judged. One 
can only add that his equanimity is not shared by all.   
Walter Gellhorn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City 102–03 (1954).  
 53. Barry C. Feld has called this the “constitutional domestication of the juvenile court,” 
which began with Kent v. United States and fully blossomed with In re Gault and In re 
Winship. BARRY C. FIELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN A NUTSHELL, 8–13 
(Thompson/West ed., 2003). See also Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 20, at 438. (“As we all 
know, the Pre-Gault juvenile court became a nightmare. The services that it offered often 
resulted in very coercive sanctions against children and families. Justice was quite irrational 
and subject to the personality of the particular judge who presided. Due process was secondary 
to the subjective evaluation of what the judge believed was in the child's ‘best interests.’”).  
 54. See e.g., In re Nassau County Dept. of Social Serv. ex rel Dantia v. Denise J., 661 
N.E. 2d 138, 139–40 (1995) (finding that a report which shows only child's positive 
toxicology for controlled substance generally does not in and of itself prove that the child has 
been neglected).  
 55. The court must find that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify 
families (i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for 
removing the child's home; and (ii) to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child's 
home.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2000), amended by  Pub. L. No. 105-82, 111 Stat. 2115.  
 56. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–78 (1982) (“Before a state may sever 
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that 
the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 57. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (finding that an unwed father was 
entitled to hearing on his fitness as parent before his children could be taken from him). 
 58. Perkins, supra note 51. 
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overreaching? In the context we are discussing now, those roles may 
be the last hope for diminishing the disparate impact of the child 
welfare system on children and families of color.59  
The following example will enable me to illustrate my 
concern.60 One of the FTDC in New York City that has been in 
existence for over ten years employed the following practices until 
very recently.61 The FTDC staff would identify potential FTDC parent 
participants from the cases being filed. After a petition was filed, the 
FTDC coordinator would discuss with the parent the possibility of 
entering the FTDC prior to the parent speaking to her attorney (the 
right to counsel for indigent respondents in New York attaches when a 
petition is filed).62 The FTDC coordinator would explain how the 
FTDC works but would not discuss the parent’s legal rights. If the 
parent thought she might want to participate, she would agree to an 
assessment and sign an assessment waiver which indicated that 
information in the assessment would not be used against her in the 
future. She would then have the opportunity to speak to her lawyer and 
learn that the conditions of participation included making an admission 
of neglect and waiving the statutory right to a preliminary hearing on 
the removal of any child from the parent’s custody. The FTDC staff 
approved only certain treatment and service programs and their 
assessment of the programs was accepted at face value by the judge. 
Family visiting procedures with children were often inflexible. 
 
 59. The current due process paradigm has not been implemented in ways that would 
ensure fairness and impartiality for children and families. But I have suggested elsewhere that 
there are ways to measure whether such a paradigm would be better for children and families 
than the problem-solving approach. Reforming the Court, supra note 17, at 34–38. 
 60. While I’m using the example of FTDC, other examples of judges creating their own 
rules could also raise these issues. See, e.g., Joy S. Rosenthal, An Argument for Joint Custody 
as an Option for All Family Court Mediation Program Participants, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 
127, 151 (2007) (positing that the family court judges’ stated policy in Brooklyn to deny joint 
custody in mediated agreements was not “overtly contemplating that people of a certain class 
or race could not handle the responsibility of such a determination. However, since we have a 
kind of de facto segregation among the Courts, the impact of what happens in Family Court is 
certainly felt more in poor, non-white communities than it is in the general population.”). 
 61. Even though several of these practices have changed recently, the requirement of 
admitting neglect and the inability to conduct a post removal hearing remain in effect. 
Moreover, this FTDC has ten years of enforcing these particular practices so they were applied 
to a significant number of respondents over that time period. This example is based on 
conversations the author has had with attorneys who have practiced in this FTDC. I do not 
name them because they continue to practice in the FTDC. Not all FTDC, nor other model 
court problem-solving courts in New York, use all of the same practices as this one. See, e.g., 
Sara P. Schechter, Family Court Case Conferencing and Post-Dispositional Tracking: Tools 
for Achieving Justice for Parents in the Child Welfare System, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 427–
430 (2001). 
 62. N.Y. Judiciary, Part 1, Family Court Act § 262(a)(i) (McKinney 2010). 
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Programs or assistance identified by the parent or her advocate were 
not options. The case would be monitored in court every thirty days or 
so. At the point where a decision would be made about whether the 
goals of the treatment plan had been met and the case should be ended, 
a meeting would be held with the FTDC staff, the prosecuting 
attorney, and the judge. Parent’s counsel was not invited to participate 
in this meeting.  
The judge’s power as leader of the FTDC team in this scenario 
is pervasive. How is that power created and used? There is no statute 
establishing the FTDC or court rules governing their practices.63 In 
2006, eight years after the FTDC were first introduced in New York, 
the New York State Office of Court Administration (OCA), the 
administrative arm of the court system, convened an advisory 
committee to develop principles and practices for FTDC in the state.64 
Those principles and practices have yet to be issued by OCA. Without 
standardized principles and practices—let alone direction from the 
legislature or administrative rules—individual judges retain enormous 
discretion in creating and enforcing their own understanding of 
problem-solving court protocols.65 Judges also use what Professor 
Miller has called “collateral judicial authority,” which “emanates from 
the repeated interactions between the judge and the variety of court 
officers and other players in the criminal or civil court system.”66 This 
 
 63. Problem-solving courts have been created by judicial fiat. Hoffman, supra note 22, 
at 1571 (“almost every drug court in this nation, except for California's recent initiative, was 
created by judges rather than legislatures.”); Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan Lippman, N.Y. State 
Unified Court Sys., Family Justice Program Initiative I, at 11 (1997) (introducing family 
treatment courts in New York). See also In re Nolan W., supra note 46, at 1224 (“[a]llowing 
juvenile courts to incarcerate parents for failing to comply with reunification orders is 
problematic because there are no statutory principles to guide or constrain the court.”). 
 64. I was asked to serve on the advisory committee when it was established in 2006. We 
met several times a year for about eighteen months. We finalized many of our 
recommendations in 2007. The process was lively and respectful of a range of very differing 
views. Our recommendations reflected a balance of concerns, including balancing access to 
due process protections with the drug court team model approach.  
 65. Recommendations for  safeguarding the judicial role in the drug court context 
include: “(1) Judges must not directly or indirectly coerce defendants to secure waivers of 
counsel; (2) Drug courts must do everything possible to ensure that every lawyer who wants to 
appear in drug court has the opportunity to do so; (3) Sanctions must be imposed in a fair and 
consistent manner; (4) The Judge who guides treatment should not be the judge who 
determines termination or hears the underlying case after termination; (5) Ex parte 
communication must never be permitted; (6) Drug court assignments must go to experiences, 
interested judges who remain for more than a year.” NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 27, at 28–29. 
 66. Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, supra note 17, at 128; See also 
Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm: Analyzing the Institutional Culture of 
Family Courts through the Lens of Social Psychology Theory (discussing the impact of a 
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judicial authority places enormous pressure on the other members of 
the problem-solving team, including parent’s counsel, to go along with 
the program, partly in exchange for influence on the judge or other 
influential court personnel at other points in time.67 Yet in resisting 
this pressure, counsel for individuals subject to the court have been 
roundly criticized for their resistance to the program or have been 
excluded from the process.68 Legal representation will not ameliorate 
all of these concerns, especially if counsel does not fulfill her basic 
duties to her clients.69 At the same time, if the lawyer who should 
serve as translator, counselor, and protector is not there at crucial 
decision-making moments or is stripped of those roles, as in the FTDC 
example, the parent may be making a bargain beyond her capacity to 
comprehend the risk.70   
Beginning a court-based process without a legal advocate also 
reinforces the power differential between the parent and the judge or 
other members of the court team.71 This can be silencing, 
manipulative, and scary. My colleague, Professor Philip Genty, has 
written about the need for lawyers to empathize with a client’s fear of 
the legal system, particularly that of indigent clients. This empathy 
requires “an understanding of the client’s deep fear and mistrust of the 
very legal system upon which the client must rely for a solution to her 
or his legal problem.”72 This distrust does not suddenly disappear 
because the judge has offered the parent treatment or services in 
exchange for due process, a monitor instead of an adjudicator, a leader 
 
variety of modes of informality, including repeat players, on the effectiveness of the court and 
the fairness to litigants) (forthcoming 34 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 2010).  
 67. See Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender 
about Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 54–58 (2000).  
 68. Id.; NOLAN, supra note 31, at 77–81 (discussing the redefined role of  defense 
counsel); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 27, at 31 
(discussing that the defense counsel usually does not participate in post-adjudication staffing 
with clients). 
 69. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 39; See also 
Reforming Family Court, supra note 16, at 25–27.”  
 70. Embracing Addiction, supra note 17, at 1568 (factors like being more likely to 
receive incarcerative sentences “may lead poor and minority defendants to accept diversion 
into drug court where others would not.”); See also Jane M. Spinak, Why Defenders Feel 
Defensive: The Defender's Role in Problem Solving Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1617 
(2003); See also Quinn, supra note 67, at 56, 64.  
 71. Romancing the Court, supra note 14, at 267–68. 
 72. Philip M. Genty, Clients Don’t Take Sabbaticals: The Indispensable In-House 
Clinic and the Teaching of Empathy, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 273, 275–76 (2000); See also Leigh 
Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a Battered Woman Fleeing an 
Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1013–19 (2007) (discussing ways in which 
battered women do not trust the legal system to protect them). 
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instead of a decider. The distrust does not arise in a vacuum. The 
parent begins the court process in communities deeply suspicious of 
government intervention; the line between the child protective 
investigator removing a child and the judge approving that removal is 
very thin.73 The Michigan study found that “African American 
families experience child welfare as intrusive systems that do not fairly 
assess and fail to appreciate their unique strength and weaknesses, do 
not examine the detriment of removal to children, and do not 
adequately explore the least restrictive placement options for their 
children.”74 Their mistrust was highlighted through several examples 
in which child protective services initiated investigations of African 
American families who sought assistance from social services when 
they had nowhere else to turn.75  
When these families reach court, the price of submitting to the 
court’s jurisdiction in exchange for help is magnified. In the FTDC, 
for example, the parent exchanges the right to maintain custody of her 
child and the right to contest allegations of neglect—including whether 
efforts were made to assist her prior to the case being filed—for 
treatment and services.76 The parent must admit to neglecting her 
 
 73. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare’s Paradox, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881 
(2007) (describing the distrust of child welfare caseworkers and agencies by residents in an 
overwhelmingly poor and African-American Chicago neighborhood while also finding the 
significant dependence on and desire for the assistance and support of these same child 
welfare officials).  
 74. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 23; Id. at 900–01 
(“Poor families are left in the bind of resenting child welfare agencies' surveillance and 
interference, yet wanting the agencies' continued presence as one of the few remaining sources 
of public aid. Moreover, the child welfare system's racial geography shows that the agencies' 
role as a safety net will be most prominent in black neighborhoods, where high rates of foster 
care, unemployment, and inadequate social services converge.”).  
 75. See e.g., THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 21 
(discussing an example where a parent was seeking assistance to purchase a stove and was 
investigated for not feeding her family.); Roberts, supra note 73, at 893 (“The child welfare 
system exacts an onerous price: it requires poor mothers to relinquish custody of their children 
in exchange for state support needed to care for them”).  
 76. Roberts, supra note 73, at 893; see Oler, supra note 21 (discussing the child welfare 
agency’s statutory requirement of reasonable efforts to preclude the need for foster care). 
Additionally, the parent may waive her right to challenge whether the state has satisfied the 
legal mandates for temporary removal of a child from parental care as defined in Nicholson v. 
Scoppetta, 3 N.Y. 3d 357, 378 (2004) (“[a] court must weigh, in the factual setting before it, 
whether the imminent risk to the child can be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid 
removal. It must balance that risk against the harm removal might bring, and it must determine 
factually which course is in the child's best interests. Additionally, the court must specifically 
consider whether imminent risk to the child might be eliminated by other means . . .”). 
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child, a humiliating experience.77 The humiliation occurs in several 
ways. First, the admission acknowledges personal responsibility 
without the state acknowledging concomitant responsibility.78 Second, 
as Professor Miller and others have identified, the client’s real voice is 
silenced to fit into the drug treatment story with its prescribed script 
and roles.79 Finally, the admission is made in the context of the 
broader way in which parents are perceived and characterized in 
Family Court proceedings. The Michigan study found a significant 
negative mischaracterization of African American youth and families 
in the child welfare system and court proceedings which was not 
supported by the facts and at times negatively affected the course of 
the case.80 Language that depersonalizes all families, such as referring 
to a parent as “Mom” throughout a proceeding rather than by using the 
parent’s name, is magnified with the knowledge that these are 
disproportionately minority parents.81  
The potential for problem-solving courts—whether the 
traditional Family Court or the current reform models—to magnify the 
disparate impact on families of color, particularly African American 
families, is rooted in the belief that these courts are the best place to 
resolve the issues that bring these families to court. But if these courts 
succeed in their goals to be the locus for services and assistance to 
 
 77. For examples of parental experiences in the child welfare system and family court 
see Rise Magazine, available at http://www.risemagazine.org/issues/Issue_3/issue_3.html (last 
visited on Apr. 15, 2010).  
 78. See generally Oler, supra, note 21; Violet Rittenhour, From the Outside In: Parents 
need and Independent Voice, RISE MAGAZINE 4, available at 
http://www.risemagazine.org/issues/Issue_5/issue_5.html (last visited on Apr. 4, 2010) 
(discussing a parental advocate disappointment that parents at a child welfare conference 
blamed only themselves for their problems without also holding the child welfare system 
accountable and that child welfare officials did not recognize their need to change, too). 
 79. Embracing Addiction, supra note 17, at 1566. There is a long history of low income 
clients accommodating a proscribed speech. See e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1 (1990). 
 80. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 31. See also 
CHAPIN HALL REPORT, supra note 18, at 19. The admission is also made in the broader context 
of societal views of drug use. See Richard C. Boldt, The “Tomahawk” and the “Healing 
Balm”: Drug Treatment Courts in Theory and Practice, 10 U. MD J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER 
& CLASS 45 (discussing the history of drug policy in the United States including “the totalizing 
moral judgments that pervasively are directed against drug users throughout American 
society”). 
 81. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 32–33. One of the 
starkest illustrations of disparate treatment was found in several case records that contained no 
documentation of any past or current substance abuse. The Caucasian parents were described 
as having “no history of substance abuse,” while the caseworker records that each time that the 
African American parent “denies history of substance abuse.” Id. at 32. 
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families as well as the ultimate decision-maker, the danger that 
families of color will disproportionately be affected is hard to deny. 
These families are less likely to find assistance in their communities,82 
more likely to be identified and investigated,83 and more likely to have 
their children removed.84 They are, therefore, more likely to find 
themselves in court and subject to the conditions I have outlined. As 
court reformers consider the best configurations of Family Courts, they 
need to address the unanticipated consequence of the disparate impact 
on their work. 
Supporters of problem-solving courts lament analyses such as 
these, in part, because they believe we are left with the same broken 
court system we have always had.85 How we move beyond this 
stalemate leads me to take a closer look at the chasm that will have to 
be bridged if the concerns of both supporters and critiquers are to be 
addressed.  
III. TALKING ABOUT PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 
The conversation at the heart of the University of Maryland 
Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class symposium on 
problem-solving courts highlights how difficult it is to talk 
meaningfully and effectively about the problem-solving court reform 
movement. The participants in the symposium who have been 
developing and experiencing the court reforms on the ground 
emphasize the aspects of the reforms that appear to be working, 
 
 82. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30 at 17–18, 20; Roberts, 
supra note 73, at 899 (citing a study by Scott Allard who discovered “a striking mismatch 
between neighborhood need and access to support services such as substance abuse treatment, 
food assistance, job training, education, and emergency aid.”). 
 83. Brooks & Roberts, supra note 21, at 453–55. There is evidence of racial bias at 
every stage of child welfare decision making, from reporting child maltreatment to placement 
of children by caseworkers and judges.. 
 84. Roberts, supra note 73, at 882 (stating that “A black child is four times as likely as a 
white child to be placed in foster care.”). 
 85. Transcript of Panel Three of Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the 
Experts, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 139 (2010)  (Judge Hueston stating 
that  
I’ll leave my comment with this: I think it’s been well documented that 
business as usual does not work. Our probation agents have hundreds of 
probationers on their dockets; they cannot monitor the chronic defendant 
effectively. And so, we have a choice of, [you] know, we’ve got some 
warts in drug courts and problem solving courts so let’s just throw the 
baby out with the bath water and not do them; let’s just do business as 
usual, which that doesn’t work so well, because look at the recidivism 
rate; there is very little treatment in jail, people recidivate within 3 months 
after they get out. It doesn’t really work.). 
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including cost effectiveness, diminished recidivism, and community 
satisfaction.86 The “critical critics” and the “supportive critics” 
emphasize ways in which the reforms fail to accomplish their goals or 
where those goals potentially conflict with other strongly held beliefs 
about issues like procedural justice, judicial impartiality and individual 
autonomy.87  
The inability of supporters and critiquers to listen to the others’ 
concerns has limited the effectiveness of both reform efforts and 
alternative or supplemental reform regimes. This failure may stem in 
part from what has been called naïve realism: our alacrity in seeing 
how the values of those with whom we disagree shape their factual 
beliefs, while we are concomitantly unable to understand how the 
values we hold shape our own factual beliefs.88 As a result, each side 
distrusts the other because they can only see how the other side’s 
values shape the facts, not how their own values do so.  
The symposium conveners were given considerable credit by 
the speakers and panelists for putting together a conference where a 
range of perspectives were presented and discussed, a situation rarely 
found in the problem-solving court world. Nevertheless, there were 
two moments when naïve realism captured the discussion. A number 
of critiquers (including myself) used the expression “not drinking the 
Kool-Aid” to indicate that they were not blithely swallowing the tenets 
of problem-solving courts. Professor Brenda Bratton Blom took the 
opportunity to point out that using that expression did not engender 
good will or move the discussion forward. She was right. Soon after, 
 
 86. Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the Experts, 10 U. MD. 
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS (2010); Tamar M. Meekins, Risky Business: Criminal 
Specialty Courts and the Ethical Obligations of the Zealous Criminal Defender, 12 BERKELEY 
J. CRIM. L. 75, 84–85 (2007) (“The outcomes that are most praised by specialty court 
supporters are a reduction in recidivism rates and an increase in the number of defendants who 
successfully receive treatment.”). 
 87. Professor Shdaimah used the term “critical supporter” to indicate her willingness to 
try to help court reformers institute problem-solving court methods while wanting, at the same 
time, to point out the potential negative aspects of the reform efforts. See, e.g., Boldt, supra 
note 48, at 1217 (“ the objection is that the drug treatment court movement not only presents 
difficulties for individual defendants and their attorneys, it also undermines larger efforts to 
develop an effective drug policy premised on a public health model.”) and Embracing 
Addiction, supra note 17, at 418. (“The court's methodology implicates political issues of 
coercion and freedom in ways that derive from and respond to some of the central policy 
problems underlying the interaction of race, poverty, and drugs in urban environments . . . [i]n 
particular, the court's rejection of due process in favor of treatment expresses the now-classic 
opposition between positive and negative liberty; that is, the freedom to be left alone and the 
freedom to ‘determine someone to be . . . this rather than that.’”).  
 88. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going 
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 
895 (2008).  
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audience members provided several examples of a problem-solving 
court violating the due process protections that the court’s own rules 
required. A supporter on the panel then in session simply dismissed the 
examples as outliers. A member of the audience responded that 
dismissing these examples as outliers without determining whether 
they represented a more significant problem in the court also 
undermined good will and stopped discussion. The panelist was 
unmoved. 
The symposium’s effort at constructive dialogue, and the 
specific interactions among participants that I explore here, refocused 
my attention in two ways. First, I wonder whether our inability to hear 
the other point of view in professional conversations is a reflection on 
our deeper inability to consider the multiplicity of viewpoints and 
experiences of court litigants. Second, has our failure to talk across our 
differences mean that both sides are ignoring important matters in the 
evolution of court reform?  
Let me propose several ways in which we can begin to address 
those questions. The first is to ask whether we can reach consensus on 
the purpose of these courts. Professor Corey Shdaimah and Professor 
Richard Boldt both pointed out during the conference that the tension 
between the therapeutic and the punitive aspects of the courts has not 
been resolved.89 Nor have we clearly identified what outcomes we are 
measuring; administrative and cost efficiencies regularly bump up 
against the substantive outcomes. Do we prioritize some outcomes—
lower recidivism, speedier court processes, and happier judicial 
personnel—over other equally satisfying results, such as more 
effective dispute resolution processes or better access to services?  
This dilemma inevitably leads to grappling with the 
distribution of resources: when is it suitable to shift resources to court-
based processes and when might resources work more effectively 
outside the court system? Which issues do we want to divert from the 
court system and which would be better served through court 
 
 89. Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the Experts, 10 U. MD. 
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS (forthcoming 2010). An example of that tension is 
found in a footnote in the recent California Supreme Court decision, where the court notes that 
“The Agency describes these contempt orders as ‘therapeutic incarceration’ and asserts: 
“Sometimes it takes a caring consequence, such as court ordered incarceration, to get the 
parent's attention in a way that enables the parent to hit their own personal rock bottom and 
become aware of the need to comply with the court's orders for treatment so reunification with 
their child can be achieved.” However, the Agency has offered no empirical support for the 
proposition that the threat of parental incarceration encourages higher reunification rates. Even 
if there were such data, the appropriate body to consider whether to modify the family 
reunification process by incorporating contempt sanctions and parental incarceration is the 
Legislature.” In re Nolan W., supra note 46, at 1236 n.8. 
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processes? None of these questions can be answered without a 
significant commitment to measuring our efforts and responding 
honestly to what we have found, even if we don’t like the answers.90 
These courts sprang originally from a heartfelt desire by judges to 
respond to what they considered a broken criminal justice system. 
When does the desire to do good have to be tempered by evidence of 
what works?  Recent studies have certainly painted a far more nuanced 
picture of when drug courts may be effective.91 Will this data be used 
to modify or even eliminate the programs that don’t work? How can 
the flexibility of developing innovative approaches to solving 
problems be balanced by principles of fairness and equality?92 And 
finally, who should make these decisions? Legislatures? Executive 
agencies? Court systems?93 As a society, who do we want making 
these decisions? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Problem-solving courts have proliferated in multiple 
dimensions of poor and minority peoples’ lives even as supporters and 
critics of these courts struggle to define the purpose of these courts and 
to evaluate their effectiveness. In the child welfare arena, less intrusive 
and more community-based approaches to addressing the complex 
societal problems that lead to child protection intervention in family 
life may be thwarted by the expansion of therapeutic court-based 
solutions. The judge-driven problem-solving paradigm that shifts 
responsibility from society to the individual to resolve the issues 
disrupting the family is likely to have a disparate impact on minority 
families who are less likely to find assistance in their communities, 
more likely to be identified and investigated, and more likely to have 
their children removed.  In addition, shifting to back-end court-based 
services increases surveillance of parents that can result in additional 
monitoring, additional legal proceedings, and even a shift into the 
 
 90. Reforming Family Court, supra note 16, at 16–24 (identifying ways in which court 
reform efforts  have not been critically analyzed for effectiveness).  
 91. Boldt, supra note 80, at 49–60. 
 92. For example, I would be more supportive of FTDC in New York if the court system 
had adopted the advisory committee principles and practices that set basic standards of 
practice for everyone involved in FTDC in the state. 
 93. In re Nolan W., supra note 46, at 1224 where the court notes that “[t]here is no 
indication that the Legislature intended parents to be punished in this manner. Moreover, as 
the facts of this case demonstrate, allowing juvenile courts to incarcerate parents for failing to 
comply with reunification orders is problematic because there are no statutory principles to 
guide or constrain the court.” 
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criminal justice system. Once these families find themselves in 
problem-solving courts, moreover, the traditional due process 
protections afforded by an impartial judge no longer serve as a final 
defense to improper or ill advised government intervention. For these 
reasons, court reformers must consider the unanticipated consequence 
of the disparate impact of their work on families of color as they strive 
to expand and improve problem-solving courts.  
 
